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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As a part of Dr. Hultgren's Statement of Facts, 
found in paragraphs 5 and 6 on page 6 of his brief, counsel 
gives the date the Notice of Intent to Commence Action was 
served by Andreini and the date the Request for Prelitigation 
Review was served. The following facts should be added so 
this Court can properly review the issues. 
1. The Notice of Intent to Commence Action and 
Claim was filed with the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing by mail on July 11, 1989, within 8 
days prior to service upon Dr. Hultgren of the Request for 
Prelitigation Review. (see Tab # 1 for copy of letter) 
Also, on page 4 of Dr. Hultgren1s brief he refers 
to pp. 37-45 of Andreini's deposition which contains an 
amendment on p. 4 4 not shown on his copy. 
2. In response to the following question on p. 44 
line 10 of Andreini's deposition. (Tab # 2 attached) 
Question; Did you ever tell him what you thought 
the problem was or what caused the problem? 
Answer: I didn't, no. 
This answer was corrected to read: 
Answer: I didn't know. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S CASE IS 
FACTUALLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLEES 
Appellee Beck and Holy Cross Hospital cite the 
cases of Ulibarri v. Christensen, 275 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1954) and Horgan v. Industrial Design Corporation, 657 P.2d 
751 (Utah 1982) which hold that emotional distress is 
insufficient to establish duress to support their argument 
that Appellant has not shown he was forced to act against 
his will in signing the release or that Appellant had no 
other viable alternative available to him. Appellees rely 
on the fact the Appellant read the release before executing 
it and had the option of no surgery. 
Appellant's case can easily be distinguished from 
the Ulibarri and Horgan cases. First, neither case involved 
the doctor/patient relationship. Second, neither case 
involved a situation where a doctor, either intentionally or 
negligently, misled his patient as to the cause of his 
injury. Third, neither case involved a doctor inducing his 
patient to execute a release by telling him that the 
"corrective surgery" the patient was to receive in 
consideration for the release would have a 100% chance of 
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success. And fourth, neither case involved a situation in 
which the consideration given in exchange for the release 
failed. 
Appellee Beck further argues that the bargained 
for exchange in consideration for the release was that the 
Appellant would simply "receive surgery." Appellee Beck 
argues that the language contained in the release "to 
correct ulnar nerve palsy" should be interpreted as "merely 
a description of the purpose for the surgery." Appellees 
drafted the release and any ambiguity as to the meaning of 
the language contained in the release should be interpreted 
in the light most favorable to the Appellant. Appellee's 
argument is a poor attempt to get around the fact that the 
so called "corrective surgery" did not correct the injury 
Appellant received to his elbows during the knee operation 
by the Appellees. 
Finally, the release of a claim for personal 
injuries may be avoided if it is executed in reliance on 
misrepresentations as to the nature or extent of the 
injuries, amounting to fraud on the part of the releasee's 
physician. Haigh v. White Way Laundry Co. 164 Iowa 143, 145 
NH 473; Mclsaac v. McMurray, 77 NH 466, 93 A 115; Bjorklund 
v. Seattle Electric Co. 35 Wash 439, 77 P 727. 
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POINT II. THE ELEMENT OF "BAD FAITH" 
DISTINGUISHES APPELLANT'S CASE FROM 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLEES 
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital relies on Fox v. 
Piercey, 227 P.2d 763 (Utah 1951), and other cases to 
support its argument that Appellant has not shown that he 
was compelled to act against his will in signing the release 
by a wrongful act of the Appellees or that he had no other 
viable alternative available to him. Again, Appellant's 
case can easily be distinguished from the Fox decision in 
that Fox (or for that matter Ulibarri and Horgan) lacked the 
element of bad faith. 
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital argues that even if 
there were a wrongful act by Appellee, which put Appellant 
in fear, Appellant executed the release after having read it 
knowing that he could have left the hospital rather than 
have the surgery. Perhaps Appellees' argument would have 
merit if the Appellees had discussed the release at the time 
the "corrective surgery" was agreed to prior to admission. 
But, in the context of Appellant's case the argument has no 
merit. 
Appellant was in a state of crisis with his hands 
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deteriorating daily as a result of the knee surgery by 
Appellant. Appellee Beck had misled Appellant as to the 
cause of the injury, and as to the anticipated success of 
the "corrective surgery" stating that Appellant's hands 
would be 50% corrected within two weeks of the operation and 
100% within a month. Appellee Holy Cross Hospital kept 
silent as to the injury. The release was not mentioned by 
any of the Appellees until after the Appellant had been 
admitted for the "corrective surgery." The elements of bad 
faith and critical timing are absent from the cases cited by 
Appellants and distinguish Appellant's case from them. 
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital further argues that 
there is a "strong sentiment for enforcing contracts such as 
the Release." There is an equally strong sentiment for 
health care providers to act honestly and in good faith with 
their patients. 
POINT III. APPELLEE HULTGREN'S ARGUMENT THAT 
APPELLANT KNEW OF HIS LEGAL INJURY BY MAY 11, 
19 87, OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT APPELLEE BECK 
MISLED APPELLANT, AS DID DR. HULTGREN BY HIS 
SILENCE, AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE TINGLING 
SENSATION IN HIS HANDS 
Appellee Hultgren argues that Appellant's legal 
injury occurred on May 11, 1987, relying on a statement from 
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Appellant's deposition. Appellant's case differs from 
Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) and Floyd v. 
Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989) 
cited by Appellee in that Appellant's injury to his hands 
was not readily apparent and in that he was misled by 
Appellee Beck to believe that the tingling sensation 
Appellant was experiencing in his hands was unrelated to his 
knee surgery. Appellant had no way of knowing he had 
suffered damages to the ulnar nerve at both elbows. 
Appellant could not reasonably have concluded that he had a 
cause of action against Appellees for an injury to his hands 
when the operation involved knee surgery based on a tingling 
sensation in his fingers which was first noticed on May 11, 
1987. Even the muscle atrophy noticed by Appellant after 
May 19, 1987, would not have signaled a specific injury, its 
cause, and the possibility of negligence, especially in 
light of the explanation of Appellee Beck and the silence of 
Appellee Holy Cross Hospital and Dr. Hultgren. 
Dr. Hultgren first argues that Andreini's claim is 
barred by the two year statute of limitations based upon the 
Foil v. Ballinger, decision, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). On 
page 9 of his brief, he contends that Andreini knew on May 
11, 1987, that he sustained an injury and that the injury 
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was caused by negligent action. It is the Appellant's 
contention that there are no facts in the records of this 
case to support Hultgren's claim Andreini knew the cause of 
his injury May 11, 1987. 
In Dr. Beck's Answer to Plaintiff's interrogatory 
#28 (copy attached as Tab #3) he stated that a diagnosis of 
ulnar nerve irritation (my emphasis) was made on May 11, 
1987 and by May 13th it was "becoming apparent that it may 
well be an ulnar neuropathy", (my emphasis added) How can 
Andreini be assessed with legal knowledge of his injury when 
his own doctor, Dr. Beck, did not make his diagnosis until 
May 18th? In that same interrogatory this was acknowledged 
by Dr. Beck's answer "and by May 18 the diagnosis was clear 
of ulnar neuropathy". (my emphasis again added). 
It is significant to point out that Hultgren as 
the anesthesiologist, like Dr. Beck, at no time disclosed to 
Andreini that he may have suffered the compression injury 
during surgery. During the entire period of Andreini's stay 
in the hospital, May 5th through May 18th, 1987, not one of 
the defendants disclosed to him the nature of his injury or 
the cause. Andreini's case is clearly distinguishable from 
the cases cited in Dr. Hultgren's brief in at least two 
important areas. 
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First, in Andreini1s case, Dr. Hultgren, Dr. Beck 
and the hospital through its employees, either negligently 
or intentionally failed to disclose to Andreini the nature 
of the cause of his injury. Dr. Hultgren asks this Court to 
imply constructive knowledge of the legal injury to Andreini 
as of May 11, 1987, and yet at no time did Dr. Hultgren 
advise him of either the injury or the cause of the injury. 
Dr. Hultgren asks that this be done in spite of Dr. Beck's 
advising Andreini that his injury was likely caused by 
arthritis "or from laying in bed" (see Andreini deposition 
p. 4 3 and 44 Tab #2). Dr. Beck continues to deny knowing 
when the injury took place as evidenced by his Answer to 
Plaintiff's interrogatory #30, "There is no way of knowing 
exactly when the injury took place". (see Addendum Tab #3) 
Secondly, there was no apparent connection between 
the surgery and the injuries sustained by Andreini. 
Consequently, there was no factual basis upon which Andreini 
could have made the judgment that he suffered a legal 
injury, especially since he was under general anesthesia for 
the entire 5£ hours of surgery. A court should not assume 
as a matter of law that Andreini, because he felt tingling 
sensations and atrophy in his fingers, knew of the legal 
cause of his elbow nerve injuries to both arms May 11, 1987. 
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There was no reason for Andreini not to believe that his 
dysfunction with his hands was an unavoidable side effect of 
surgery and temporary in nature, especially based upon 
non-disclosure by defendants and their inaction. He had no 
reason to believe that immediate surgical intervention was 
necessary to avoid permanent disability. 
Finally, as to Dr. Hultgren, since Andreini was in 
continued treatment for his injuries until May 19, 1987, 
should not the statute of limitations begin on May 20th? 
The holding in Peteler v. Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 248 and 
Massey v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248 (Nev. 1983) would certainly 
support this proposition. In Massey v. Litton p. 252, the 
Court noted that the degree of diligence required by a 
patient in learning of the negligent causes of his or her 
condition is diminished while the patient is still under his 
physician's care. Until Andreini's post operative problems 
were resolved Dr. Hultgren had an ongoing duty to disclose 
the nature and cause of his injuries and to monitor 
and evaluate his condition. The jury could find that his 
failure to do so constituted continuing negligence until the 
date of his discharge May 19, 1987. 
The patient's awareness of negligence in 
malpractice cases is a factual determination. Recent cases 
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interpreting the Foil decision cite the following factors 
in making that determination: III the obviousness of the 
connection between the treatment and the injury; (2) the 
possibility that the injury might be mistaken as an 
unavoidable consequence of the medical treatment; (3) the 
existence of a medical diagnosis suggesting that the injury 
was caused by negligence; ( 1) the patient's subjective 
understanding of the field of medicine; (5) the catastrophic 
nature of the injury; and (6) the duration of the 
physicianfs direct supervision over the patient. 
In this case, as to item (]) above, there was no 
obvious connection between the "knee surgery" and damaged 
nerves in the elbows of both arms. As to Item #2, Andreini 
was led to believe the problem was either genetic-arthritic 
or caused from laying in bed for a prolonged period of time. 
Consequently, until he was advised by the nurse July 2, 1987 
about "strapping" being the cause he had every reason to 
believe his problems were an unavoidable consequence of 
surgery. As to item (3), the first diagnosis of Andreini's 
injury was that which was reflected on Dr. Beck's discharge 
summary of May 19, 1987. This logically should be the 
starting point for the two year statute of limitations not 
May 11, 1987. Also, as to item (4) Andreini had no 
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subjective understanding of medicine, such as that of the 
nurse in Hove v. McMaster, 621 P. Jd *.'»4 (Ut.ih 14H0), 
consequently, his actions have to be viewed from a 
layperson1s standard. 
As to item (5), Andreini did not suffer known 
catastrophic injuries until May 19, 1987, when his fingers 
became severely atrophied and claw-like and the diagnosis of 
bilateral ulnar neuropathy was first made and written in his 
discharge summary. Prior to that time he was simply aware 
of symptoms of something being wrong. 
Finally, as to item (6) Andreini was under the 
direct care and control of Dr. Beck until May 19, 198 7, when 
he was discharged from the hospital. Can it be said in 
fairness that Andreini prior to May 19, 1987, had a fair 
opportunity to investigate available t <i • • relevant 
information to decide whether he had a cause of action 
against Dr. Hultgren, or Dr. Beck, or the hospital? 
Especially in light of the fact D:i Be< :k, Dr. Hultgren and 
the hospital deny any wrongdoing even as this appeal is 
taken. 
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POINT IV. APPELLEES1 ARGUMENT THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT 
ARE PREMISED ON THE FACT APPELLANT EXECUTED 
THE RELEASE AND OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT 
APPELLANT WAS FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED INTO 
EXECUTING THE RELEASE 
Appellant concurs with the language cited by 
Appellees from Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983), 
that leave to amend is discretional with the trial court 
unless it can be shown that there was an abuse of discretion 
which prejudiced the Appellant. The Appellant has made 
reference in his brief and in this Reply Brief to the 
conduct of Appellee Beck and the conspiracy of silence 
involving Appellee Holy Cross Hospital and Dr, Hultgren. 
Appellant was crippled in both hands as a result 
of an injury to the ulnar nerve in both elbows caused during 
a surgical procedure on Appellant's right knee. None of the 
Appellees informed Appellant that he had sustained nerve 
injuries to his elbows during the knee surgery. There is 
evidence in the record to show that Appellee Beck 
misinformed Appellant as to the cause of the injury. There 
is evidence in the record to show I hat Appellee Holy Cross 
Hospital failed to explain to Appellant that his elbows had 
been injured as a result of "strapping" caused during the 
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knee surgery. There is evidence that Appellee Beck mis-
represented Appellant that the "corrective surgery" would 
correct the injury to his elbows. There is uncontradicted 
evidence that the "corrective surgery11 did not work. All of 
the foregoing substantiates Appellant's argument that he was 
fraudulently induced into believing that the "corrective 
surgery" would correct the injury to his elbows and that the 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant's 
motion to amend his complaint. 
POINT V. ANDREINI'S REQUEST FOR 
PRE-LITIGATION REVIEW IS NOT 
PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT 
Dr. Hultgren's Statement of Facts paragraph 6 page 
6 states that on July 19, 1989, Andreini filed with the 
Department of Commerce and served on Dr. Hultgren a Request 
for Prelitigation Review > Andreini mailed 
the Notice of Intent to Commence Action to the Department of 
Commerce. (see Tab # 1 ) Dr. Hultgren admits this filing on 
the second to the last line of his brief at page 14 and puts 
the filing date as July 19, 1987. 
Since Andreini filed the Request for Pre]iligation 
Review within 8 days of filing his Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action, how can it be argued that it was not filed 
within 6 0 days as sot forth in the statute. If the Court 
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interpreted 78-14-12(2) of the Utah Code Ann. to mean "60 
days after the service of the statutory Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action" under Section 78-14-8, it was incorrect in 
having done so. The statute must be read literally as per 
its specific terms. If that is what the legislature 
intended then the statute should be amended accordingly. 
This Court should not hold that Andreini failed to comply 
with 78-14-12(2) by filing the Request for Review more than 
6 0 days after the Notice to Commence Action was served on 
Dr. Hultgren because the statute reads "within 6 0 days after 
the filing of a statutory Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action under Section 78-14-8", not after the service of the 
notice. 
CONCLUSION 
The district c<::»i u : t improper] y conc 1 uded that 
appellant, on May 11, 1987, discovered or through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that 
he Iiad sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by 
the negligence of Defendants. This Court should make a 
specific finding that the Statute of Limitations should 
begin to run May 19, 1987. 
Further, the district court's ruling that 
appellant's Request for Prelitigation Review was 
procedurally deficient since it was not filed within 60 days 
after the Notice of Intent to Commence an Action was served 
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upon Dr. Hultgren was erroneous. The statute in question 
requires that the Request for Prelitigation Review be filed 
within 6 0 days after the Notice of Intent to Commence an 
Action is "filed" with the Department of Commerce, not 
served. 
As to the "release" this Court should hold that it 
was executed under duress and thus void, For pub] ic policy 
reasons the release should also be held void because of the 
circumstances under which it was executed. There should be 
a complete ban on the execution of releases by patients when 
hospitalized unless it can be shown that the terms were 
negotiated some time prior to admission when the parties 
were on more equal terms. 
For these reasons, the Appellant respectfully 
urges this Court to reverse the decision of the District 
Court and remand the matter for trial of all issues 
presented by the Amended Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $' day of 
^strtz^Js* 1991. 
Mi^T BILJAffi(S~ ^ 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to J. Anthony Eyre, City 
Center I, #330, 175 East 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, Philip R. Fishier, Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, and David W. Slagle, 10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, postage 
prepaid, this _J^_day of ^ W ^ ^ * «&^ ,1991. 
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ATTACHMENTS 
Letter to Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
dated July 11, 1987. 
Portions from the Deposition of Eugene R. Andreini. 
Portions of R. Da^  n c:i Beck, M.D. ' s Answers - interrogatories. 
Tabl 
MATT B I L J A N I C 
ATTOHNEY AT LAW 
7355 SOUTH 9 m EAST 
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 
255-3578 
J u l y 1 1 , 1989 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Ileber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: Eugene R. Andreini 
Attention: Loretta 
Dear Loretta: 
Please find enclosed a copy of the Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action and Claim that was served by Certified Mail 
upon Bruce Ilultgren M.D. on the 12th day of May, 1989. A 
copy of the receipt is attached hereto. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Matt Biljanic 
MB/sn 
Enclosures 
Tab 2 
Tab 3 
from laying in bed. 
Q. Did he ever venture any other opinion as to what 
the cause of this tingling was? 
A. Well, yeah. He didn't want to like incriminate 
himself to anything. It's like it could be hereditary, 
it could have been going to happen anyway, it could have 
been my body structure, it could have been — I mean, he 
come up with a lot of things that it could be — be 
anything and everything except maybe somebody's fault. 
Q. Did you ever tell him what you thought the 
problem was or what caused the problem? 
A. I didn't, p#Kn0 
Q. Did you ever indicate to him that you thought it 
might be as a result of the surgery? 
A. Oh, he knew that that was how I felt. I mean, I 
went in and everything was okay and my hands worked, and 
I come out and they were bad. So, I mean, it was — I 
don't know what it was, but obviously something went 
wrong. We even discussed the fact that it was 
probably — that it was so coincidental that both arms at 
the same time. 
Q. Are the symptoms in both arms the same? 
A. Yup. 
Q. Do you notice the symptoms in both arms at the 
same time? 
44 
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STATE OF 
S> : s s . 
rt/r L/ttt? ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing 
testimony consisting of pages 3 through 95, inclusive, 
and that the same is a true and correct transcription of 
said testimony except as it has been corrected by me 
below, reasons for said corrections being given therefor 
and initials by said corrections having been affixed 
thereto. 
Page - Line Correction Reason Initials 
CQ//» U .-/ / ^ / / C / / *'€*/* ^£>/^ (_ 
94- I* '£</(</»'{ fan'" £1 ^ 
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1. 
-f-e- ?K,#-
Eugene R. Andre in i 
Subscr ibed and sworn t o b e f o r e me /ttris 
of OdUfA) , 1990. 
Notary Publ i c My commission e x p i r e s : otary u b l i c 
R e s i d i n g a t 
JULIE N. CLEGG, CSR, RPR, CM 
the text). 
A. No such definition exists. Ulnar nerve palsy is a 
clinical syndrome consisting of numbness and weakness in the 
distribution of the ulnar nerve. No text cited. 
27. Q. Please state what is ordinarily the cause of 
"bilateral ulnar nerve compression". 
A. Bilateral ulnar nerve compression is caused by 
anything pushing on both ulnar nerves. 
28. Q. Did you make a diagnosis of plaintiff's condition 
regarding his hands? If so, when did you make it and what was your 
diagnosis? 
A. The diagnosis of ulnar nerve irritation was made on 
5/11/87, at which point elbow pads were initiated. By 5/13 it was 
becoming apparent that it may well be an ulnar nerve neuropathy and 
by 5/18 the diagnosis was clear of ulnar neuropathy. 
29. Q. Did you know about plaintiff's condition to his 
hands prior to May 12, 198 7? If so, when. 
A. No. 
30. Q. Do you have an opinion as to the cause of plain-
tiff's bilateral ulnar neuropathy? 
A. See answers to interrogatories 7, 8 and 9. There 
is no way of knowing exactly when the injury took place. It could 
have occurred over a lengthy period of time. 
31. Q. Do you agree with Dr. Nord's evaluation of plain-
tiff's condition as stated in his letter dated August 27, 1987? 
If not please state the parts you disagree with. 
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